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RICO AS A REMEDY FOR HAZARDOUS
WASTE VICTIMS:
CAN PLAINTIFFS OVERCOME THE
PROBLEMS OF CAUSATION?
American industry has generated vast quantities of hazardous
waste1 in the wake of rapid technological innovation with synthetic
materials.2 Unfortunately, industry has failed to develop safe and
responsible methods of hazardous waste disposal.3 As a result, haz-
I See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6991 (1988). Hazardous waste is defined as:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, con-
centration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may - (A) cause, or
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious, irre-
versible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or
potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Id. § 6903(5).
"More than 80 billion pounds of toxic waste are dumped in the United States each and
every year, and the volume is steadily growing." Gore, Foreword to S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN &
C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTES IN AMERICA at ix (1982).
2 See S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTES IN AMERICA 22-23 (1982)
[hereinafter S. EPSTEIN]. Production of synthetic organics increased from one billion pounds
in 1941 to over 300 billion pounds in 1976, id., with 50 chemicals alone accounting for 172
billion pounds. See Comment, Hazardous Waste Liability and Compensation: Old Solu-
tions, New Solutions, No Solutions, 14 CONN. L. REV. 307, 309 n.11 (1982); see also S. REP.
No. 849, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (1980) (347 billion pounds of hazardous chemicals produced
in 1979). Production of hazardous waste has increased at an annual rate of 10% since the
end of World War II. See S. EPSTEIN, supra, at 7.
3 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Pub. No. SW-826, EvERYBODY'S PROBLEM:
HAZARDOUS WASTE 15 (1980). Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") studies conclude
that environmentally unsound methods have been used to dispose of 90% of hazardous
wastes. Id. In 1979, the EPA estimated that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 inactive and uncon-
trolled waste sites existed, of which between 1,200 and 2,000 presented serious public health
risks. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6120. In 1981, 115 sites were listed by the EPA as high
priority sites which were eligible for remedial actibn under Superfund; 24 of these were
considered more dangerous than New York's Love Canal. See S. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at
448-49. For a listing of sites considered potentially hazardous by the EPA, see id. at 450-
545.
In 1988, industrial plants released 4.5 billion pounds of poisonous chemicals into the
nation's land, air, and water. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1990, at All, col. 2. The Congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment estimates that the EPA's figures represent only a
fraction of the total amount of toxic emissions created by industry. Id. at col. 3. In addition,
many polluters are exempted from reporting requirements and not all toxic chemicals are
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ardous waste mismanagement has led to widespread personal in-
jury and real property damages. 4 The harm generated by hazard-
ous waste mismanagement has alarmed the public5 and spawned a
complex scheme of federal and state environmental legislation.'
Yet, hazardous waste victims are not adequately compensated
under existing environmental statutory remedies.7 Recently, the
subject to reporting requirements. Id. The industrial and chemical revolutions of the past 40
years provided the origin of the hazardous waste problem. See Comment, supra note 2, at
309-14. For an historical perspective of America's treatment of hazardous waste, see Melosi,
Hazardous Waste and Environmental Liability: An Historical Perspective, 25 Hous. L.
REV. 741 (1988).
4 See Comment, Pursuing a Cause of Action in Hazardous Waste Pollution Cases, 29
BUFFALO L. REV. 533, 534-37 (1980). Personal injury may result from contact with hazardous
substances. Id. at 536. This contact can occur in a number of ways, including, but not lim-
ited to, exposure via food, water, or the air. Id. Hazardous substances can cause cancer, gene
mutation, birth defects, and miscarriages. Id. at 537 nn.22 & 24. Property damage can occur
from contact with gases in the air or liquids in the ground. Id. at 536. Contaminated water
supplies and destruction of vegetation are among some of the known effects of contact. Id.
at 536-37 nn.14 & 21.
One commentator has suggested that state import bans on hazardous waste may be
contributing to the widespread illegal disposal of hazardous wastes. See Stone, Supremacy
and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding State Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15 CoLUM.
J. ENvTL. L. 1, 2-4 (1990). State bans on foreign hazardous waste importation have been
subjected to commerce clause scrutiny by the courts. See id. at 16-22. The consensus of this
case law is that "such bans must only apply to government funded disposal facilities...
[and] allow[] private facilities to accept foreign wastes" in order to be valid. Id. at 21-22
(footnote omitted).
I See Gore, supra note 1. A few years ago, the problems associated with hazardous
waste were not recognized by most Americans. Id. They have, however, "climbed to the top
of the public opinion polls" as a serious concern to the American people. Id.; see White,
Economizing'on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Our Hazardous Wastes, 25 Hous. L.
REv. 899, 899-900 (1988). Four major incidents focused national attention on the threat of
hazardous waste: (1) the kepone contamination of the James River; (2) the polychlorinated
biphenyl (PCB) contamination of the Hudson River; (3) the polybrominated bihenyl (PBB)
contamination of Michigan livestock; and (4) the Love Canal incident. Id. One commentator
has suggested that America's environmental awakening was first stirred by Rachel Carson's
Silent Spring, which was concerned with the dangerous side effects of toxic chemicals. See
Udall, Toxic Wastes: Reflections on the Evolution of Environmental Law, 25 Hous. L. REV.
729, 732-34 (1988).
' See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental, Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988); The
Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1279 (1988). In 1986, Congress amended
CERCLA in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), providing for
a doubling of both the amount of time and the dollar amount authorized as an initial re-
sponse from the fund to a release or threatened release of hazardous substances. SARA,
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (current version in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 and at 26 U.S.C. §§ 59A, 4611-4612, 4661-4662, 4671-4672, 9507-9509 (1988));
see also State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), N.Y. ENvTm. CONSERv. LAW
88 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984).
7 See S. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 275-92 (discussing difficulties of litigating hazardous
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 8  ("RICO")
has been used with some success to bolster existing remedies.9
waste claims); Comment, supra note 4, at 540 (arguing that present tort law and statutory
regulation "must be adapted to the nontraditional nature of hazardous waste" cases); see
also Binder, The Potential Application of RICO in the Natural Resources/Environmental
Law Context, 63 DEN. U.L. REv. 535, 560-62 (1986) (discussing use of RICO for actions
under CERCLA). The author noted:
[t/he private cause of action [under CERCLA] is exceedingly narrow, being lim-
ited to "response costs," which are part of a "clean up" or response to a hazardous
waste problem. Thus, investigative costs and attorney's fees are not recoverable as
"response costs." Only once a party has begun to implement a government-au-
thorized clean up program can "response costs" be recovered. Consequently, a pri-
vate cause of action for only damages is unavailable under CERCLA.
Id. at 560-61.
Common law remedies, such as nuisance, negligence, trespass, and strict liability are
particularly unsuitable to fairly compensate hazardous waste victims, primarily because of
the expiration of the statute of limitations and the difficulty of proving causation. See Far-
ber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1222-28 (1987) (statute of limitations and
establishing link between defendant and release of substance major barriers); Note, The
Applicability of Civil RICO to Toxic Waste Polluters, 62 IND. L.J. 451, 452-57 (1987) [here-
inafter Polluters] (rules developed to compensate individualized wrongs do not work applied
to toxic injury); Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental
Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575,
passim (1983) (differences between toxic injuries and individualized wrongs create incon-
gruity with tort system). But see Nelson & Fransen, Playing With A Full Deck: State Use
of Common Law Theories to Complement Relief Available Through CERCLA, 25 IDAHo L.
REV. 493, 508-17 (1989) (contending that common law remedies can effectively bolster inad-
equacies of relief under CERCLA).
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990). See generally Blakey, The RICO Civil
Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAM L. REV. 237, 249-
80 (1982) [hereinafter Reflections] (discussion and review of RICO legislative history);
Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology
Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62
NOTRE DA~m L. REV. 526 (1987) [hereinafter Equitable Relief] (discussing civil RICO and
criticizing narrow reading given by Ninth Circuit in principal case); Blakey & Gettings,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and
Civil Remedies, 53 TENtI. L.Q. 1009 (1980) [hereinafter Basic Concepts]; Strafer, Massumi
& Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling", 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
655 (1981) [hereinafter Everybody's Darling] (discussing civil RICO generally).
Recently, RICO has been widely scorned and scrutinized by business groups, members
of Congress, and judges. See S. REP. No. 269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1990) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT]. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that RICO "was designed primar-
ily to be a potent criminal statute aimed at eradicating organized crime syndicates." Id. at 2.
The committee also lamented that RICO's expansive language has "given rise to civil RICO
claims ranging far afield from Congress' original purpose in enacting RICO." Id. The Senate
Report accompanied a recent bill to amend RICO which was introduced in the 101st Con-
gress. See S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The bill was designed to reduce the availabil-
ity of the treble damages remedy in RICO suits. See SENATE REPORT, supra, at 5. However,
under the proposed bill "[n]o cause of action under RICO, with the exception of non-violent
free speech, [was] eliminated." Id. at 7.
1 See infra notes 49-81 and accompanying text. RICO has been used with some success
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Section 1962 of RICO prohibits any person from using money
derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in an en-
terprise;' acquire control of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering;" conduct an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering; or conspire to engage in any of the prohibited acts out-
lined above.' 3 After establishing a section 1962 violation, a plaintiff
may recover treble damages and attorneys' fees if he demonstrates
that his business or property damage was caused "by reason of"
such a violation.'4
This Note will discuss why proof of causation has emerged as
a primary obstacle to recovery in RICO-based hazardous waste
claims. Part I will analyze civil RICO's causation requirement. Part
II will discuss several representative RICO-based hazardous waste
decisions and demonstrate that, for at least one class of hazardous
waste plaintiffs, the causation requirement may present an insur-
mountable barrier to recovery.
I. RICO CAUSATION
In the majority of RICO-based hazardous waste suits, and in-
deed in the overwhelming majority of all civil RICO suits, it is al-
leged that the defendant conducted business through a pattern of
racketeering activity in violation of section 1962(c).' 5 After proving
a section 1962(c) violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his
business or property damage was caused either by the commission
of predicate acts of racketeering or by an unlawful competitive ad-
vantage the defendant gained through the commission of predicate
acts of racketeering.'6 Because violations of federal environmental
in many other cases involving environmental matters. See, e.g., Beauford v. Helmsley, 865
F.2d 1386, 1391-92 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (condominium conversion prospectus fraudulently
concealed presence of asbestos), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 539 (1989); Cincinnati Gas & Elec.
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 74-88 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (scheme by manufacturer
of nuclear reactor to defraud utility), aff'd, 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1033 (1989).
10 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
" Id. § 1962(b).
12 Id. § 1962(c).
" Id. § 1962(d).
14 Id. § 1964(c).
15 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (Q 1962(c) given less
restrictive reading than rest of statute as to activities RICO designed to deter).
16 Id. at 494-97. Sedima overruled several circuit court decisions which held that injury
from predicate acts alone under section 1962(c) was not compensable. Id. at 497.
The Sedima Court also noted that recoverable damages under section 1962(c) "include,
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statutes do not of themselves constitute racketeering activity, vic-
tims of hazardous waste mismanagement instead base their RICO
claims on alleged acts of mail or wire fraud. 7 However, predicating
a RICO claim on mail and wire fraud in hazardous waste suits in-
troduces significant causation obstacles.' 8
Courts generally agree that neither a plain meaning analysis 8
nor a review of legislative history aids in interpreting the "by rea-
son of" causation requirement of section 1964(c).2 e While the legis-
lative history addresses section 1964(c) as a whole, it does not spe-
cifically address the intent behind the "by reason of"
terminology.2' Traditionally, the federal statutory "by reason of'
language has created a common law tort causation requirement.
22
but are not limited to, the sort of competitive injury for which the dissenters would allow
recovery." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 n.15. The majority agreed in part with a dissenting Jus-
tice Marshall who argued that "racketeers do not engage in predicate acts as ends in them-
selves .... Congress' concern was ... for the competitors and investors whose businesses
and interests are harmed or destroyed by racketeers, or whose competitive positions decline
because of infiltration in the relevant market." Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis in original); see also Reflections, supra note 8, at 280 ("[bloth immediate victims of
racketeering activity and competing organizations were contemplated as civil plaintiffs")
(emphasis in original).
17 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). Mail or wire fraud is alleged in the overwhelming
majority of RICO complaints. See Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, ABA SEC.
CoRP., BANKING & Bus. LAW 55, 55-56 (1985). See generally Rakoff, The Federal Mail
Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REv. 771 passim (1980). Mail and wire fraud are useful
predicate offenses in RICO based hazardous waste suits. See Polluters, supra note 7, at 474-
79. Businesses engaged in hazardous waste disposal have extensive mail and wire communi-
cations with private and public entities, and such communications can expose fraudulent
schemes. See id. at 474-78. Indeed, companies dealing with hazardous waste are required
under RCRA to document everything that happens to their waste. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§
6922-6974 (1988).
18 See infra notes 49-81 and accompanying text.
19 See Equitable Relief, supra note 8, at 580. Judicial hostility to RICO has led lower
courts to avoid application of the plain meaning rule which would compel a liberal construc-
tion of the statute. Id.; see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (Con-
gress calls for liberal construction of RICO in § 904(a)); Reflections, supra note 8, at 240-41
n.13 (noting that Supreme Court consistently admonishes lower courts to interpret RICO
according to its plain meaning, to effectuate its remedial purpose).
10 See Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding little legislative his-
tory, but noting Congress' "expansive language" and "express admonition" to construe
RICO liberally).
22 See Bastian v. Petren Resources Corp., 699 F. Supp. 161 (N.D. IMI. 1988), aff'd, 892
F.2d 680 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2590 (1990). See generally Reflections, supra
note 8 (detailed discussion of RICO's legislative history).
22 See, e.g., Zepick v. Tidewater Midwest, Inc., 856 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1988) (inter-
preting § 23 of Consumer Products Safety Act); see also Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-37 (1983) ("by reason of" imposes
proximate cause requirement on Clayton Act treble damages claims); Brandenburg v. Seidel,
1990]
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The lack of background comment on section 1964(c) suggests that
Congress did not intend to depart from this traditional common-
law analysis.23 Consequently, courts have searched elsewhere for
guidance in establishing RICO causation.
The courts, for example, have analogized RICO causation to
the causation requirements under the antitrust laws. In Carter v.
Berger,14 the plaintiff alleged that its taxes rose due to an unwar-
ranted decrease in the defendant's taxes after the defendant had
bribed government officials." The court held that the plaintiff
lacked standing under RICO because the Clayton Act2 6 bars a
plaintiff from recovering damages "passed on" from the directly
injured party, which in this case was the government.27 The court
reasoned that some antitrust principles "should apply to RICO
cases, not the least because the damage provision in section
1964(c) [of RICO] is practically verbatim the damages provision in
the antitrust laws."2 s Indeed, Congress modeled RICO's private
cause of action after section 4 of the Clayton Act.29 However, a
859 F.2d 1179, 1189 n.11 (4th Cir. 1988) (following Sedima which found normal proximate
cause inquiry appropriate). But see Reflections, supra note 8, at 255 n.52 (questioning adop-
tion of proximate cause in civil RICO suits); Everybody's Darling, supra note 8, at 694
(proposing that cause-in-fact sufficiently supports RICO standing). See generally Equitable
Relief, supra note 8, at 589 n.238 ("use of 'by reason of' to indicate causal connection is a
feature found in a number of other federal statutes").
23 See Brandenburg, 859 F.2d at 1189. In Brandenburg, the court noted that "Civil
RICO is of course a statutory tort remedy." Id. "Causation principles generally applicable to
tort liability must be considered applicable [to civil RICO]." Id. Causation is a question of
law decided by judges. See id.
24 777 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985).
25 Id. at 1176.
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988). Antitrust laws are designed to assure a competitive econ-
omy based on the belief that through competition, producers will strive to satisfy consumer
wants at the lowest prices while sacrificing the fewest resources. See Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
17 Carter, 777 F.2d at 1176. Causal relationship, improper motive, nature of the injury,
and directness of the injury are factors to consider during Clayton Act standing analysis.
See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 537-38 (1983). The directness of the injury appears to be the dominant factor. See, e.g.,
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 740 (1977) ("allowing indirect purchasers to re-
cover using pass-on theories ... would transform treble-damages actions into massive mul-
tiparty litigations"); see also Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079,
1081-83 (6th Cir. 1983) (overview of standing tests under Clayton Act, including "direct
injury" and "target area" tests).
28 Carter, 777 F.2d at 1175-76. The court further maintained that concentrating the full
amount of RICO recovery in the hands of the direct victim promotes deterrence. Id. More-
over, a direct victim is most privy to the essential facts necessary to make out a RICO
violation. Id.
2 See Everybody's Darling, supra note 8, at 689. "In creating RICO, Congress was
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majority of courts and commentators have rejected the antitrust
causation analogy, primarily because although RICO originally was
conceived as an amendment to the antitrust laws,30 it subsequently
was drafted outside the antitrust laws in part to avoid their rigid
standing requirements. 1 Accordingly, it is submitted that antitrust
standing requirements are not appropriate inRICO suits.
Other hazardous waste cases have focused on the question of
whether the injury in question was the direct or indirect result of
the alleged predicate acts. In Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co.,32 for
example, the Court stated that "the compensable injury necessarily
is the harm caused by the predicate acts."3 In the wake of
Sedima, several courts have held that compensable injury must be
directly caused by the predicate acts.3 4 Proponents of a direct in-
jury requirement also have argued that a victim who suffers indi-
rect injury as a result of racketeering activity is not the real party
in interest.35 The majority of courts, however, have characterized
consciously adopting the enforcement mechanisms... proven effective in ... antitrust law."
Id. at 688-89.
10 See id. at 702.
" See In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp 1388, 1432 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The Catanella court
observed that "the majority of courts have either rejected the [antitrust competitive in-
quiry] requirement... or abandoned it in favor of another approach." Id. at 1431-32 (cita-
tions omitted). One commentator notes that placing antitrust limitations on RICO actions
"flies in the face of the very consideration that led to the drafting of RICO as a separate
statute." See Reflections, supra note 8, at 255 n.52; see also Equitable Relief, supra note 8,
at 554 (antitrust analogy inappropriate).
32 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
33 Id. at 497.
4 See, e.g., Town of Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., 829 F.2d 1263,
1268 (3d Cir. 1987) (plaintiff not directly injured by bribes); Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926,
933 (11th Cir. 1987) (employee discharge did not directly flow from commission of predicate
acts); Carter, 777 F.2d at 1175 (only directly injured plaintiffs get full recovery); see also In
re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 63 Bankr. 415, 418-19 (N.D. IM. 1986) (law firm's injuries in
not receiving fees too indirect although defendants fraudulently prevented clients from re-
ceiving personal injury settlements); cf. Warren v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 759 F.2d 542,
544 (6th Cir. 1985) (shareholder and creditor of corporation had no standing to bring RICO
action for corporate injury).
5 See City of Milwaukee v. Universal Mortgage Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992, 996-97 (E.D.
Wis. 1988). In Universal Mortgage, the City of Milwaukee alleged that it incurred damages
as a result of the defendant's scheme to defraud the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Id. at 993-96. The court held that RICO plaintiffs must allege "injuries that
establish plaintiffs as the real parties in interest; that is, that the plaintiffs are parties that
suffered direct rather than indirect injuries at the hands of the defendants." Id. at 998; see
also Bass v. Campagnone, 838 F.2d 10, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1988) (union itself, rather than union
members, was real party in interest).
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "Every action shall be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). A litigant has a
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the "direct injury" requirement as overly restrictive and contrary
to the language of Sedima.36 In Sedima, the Court noted that "re-
coverable damages ... flow from the commission of the predicate
acts.""7 These courts hold that the word "flow" connotes a liberal
causal nexus standard that is consistent with RICO's remedial pur-
poses.38 In addition, the Sedima Court would allow recovery for
"competitive injury," ' which may fairly be classified as an indirect
injury.4 0 Therefore, it is submitted that the direct injury require-
ment should be rejected in favor of a more flexible test of causa-
tion consistent with RICO's liberal construction clause.41
Other courts have applied a traditional tort causation analysis,
holding that a plaintiff is harmed "by reason of" a RICO violation
if the predicate acts constitute the factual cause and the legal or
proximate cause of the alleged injury.42 Factual causation asks
whether the plaintiff would have been injured "but for" the de-
fendant's RICO violation.43 Questions relevant to a proximate
reasonable time to join or substitute the real party in interest. Id. Rule 17(a) enables the
defendant to present defenses he has against the real party in interest, protects the defend-
ant against a subsequent action by a party actually entitled to relief, and ensures that a
judgment will have the proper res judicata effect. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78, 84 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974). The
rule enforces the principle that "the action must be brought by a person who possesses the
right to enforce the claim and who has a signifigant interest in the litigation." Id. at 83
(footnote omitted).
3' See Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 833 (5th Cir. 1988) ("damages are those which
'flow from the commission of the predicate acts'" (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 (empha-
sis added) (footnote omitted))); see also Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1988)
(both direct and indirect injuries contemplated by Sedima).
3" Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497.
11 See Ocean Energy II v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 744 (5th Cir.
1989); Sperber, 849 F.2d at 64; Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1189 (4th Cir. 1988).
11 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 n.15.
10 See Sperber, 849 F.2d at 63.
41 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947
(1970). See generally Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv.
167 (1980) (comprehensive analysis of background and rationale of liberal construction
clause).
41 Ocean Energy II, 868 F.2d at 744. "The Supreme Court has explained these injury
and causation requirements as aspects of standing, rather than elements of the civil RICO
plaintiff's prima facie case." Brandenburg, 859 F.2d at 1187.
, See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. An act or omission is not
regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it. See
id. Thus, the omission of crossing signals at a railroad intersection is irrelevant when an
automobile collides with the 68th car. See id. (citing Sullivan v. Boone, 205 Minn. 437, 440
286 N.W. 350, 351-52 (1939)).
The "but for" test is replaced by the "substantial factor" test when concurrent causes
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cause analysis include: (1) If the RICO claim is based on mail or
wire fraud, did the plaintiff or a third party rely on such fraud?""
(2) Is a finding of legal causation consistent with RICO's design?45
(3) Were plaintiff's injuries foreseeable, and were superseding or
intervening causes present?46 (4) Are less drastic forms of relief
available? 47 (5) Should liability extend further due to intentional
are implicated. See id. at 267 (citing Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., 146
Minn. 430, 440, 179 N.W. 45, 48-49 (1920), overruled on other grounds by 183 N.W. 521
(1921)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 433 (1965) (adopting substantial
factor rule).
4 See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311 (2d Cir.
1990). In Long Island Lighting, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove detrimental
reliance on the alleged mail and wire fraud, thereby severing the causal nexus. See id. at
1311-12; see also Brandenburg, 859 F.2d at 1188 n.10; Shaw v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 726
F. Supp. 969, 972-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("injury ... must result from reliance on... fraud in
order to meet the causation requirements of Section 1964(c)").
Some courts also have held that the causal nexus is severed if a third party, rather than
the plaintiff, has relied on the mail or wire fraud. See Rolex Watch, 726 F. Supp. at 972-73.
The Rolex Watch court would allow "recovery to a plaintiff who was proximately injured by
defendants' deception of a third party." Id. at 973. It is submitted that the above reliance
rules should not apply in RICO cases in which the plaintiff alleges a competitive injury,
rather than an injury caused by the commission of predicate acts such as mail or wire fraud.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
45 See Equitable Relief, supra note 8, at 529.
46 See Brandenburg, 859 F.2d at 1189. A proximate or "legal cause determination
[under RICO] is properly one of law for the court, taking into consideration such factors as
the foreseeability of the particular injury, the intervention of other independent causes, and
the factual directness of the causal connection." Id.
Several courts have held that foreseeability of a RICO injury alone is insufficient to
establish proximate cause. See Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 834 (5th Cir. 1988);
Sperber, 849 F.2d at 65-66. In Sperber, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's illegal
trading practices inflated certain stocks which the plaintiffs had purchased at the inflated
price. Id. at 62. The plaintiffs claimed that after the defendant's manipulation became pub-
lic, the stocks plummeted in value, causing the plaintiffs to suffer heavy losses. Id. The
court held that while it was foreseeable that the defendant's schemes could have caused
plaintiffs' losses, the causal nexus was too attenuated and the injuries too remote from the
defendant's wrongdoing. Id. at 65-66.
Intervening causes can sever the causal nexus. See PRossER & KEETON, supra note 43,
at 301-19. For instance, in Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F. Supp. 424 (M.D.N.C. 1983),
it was held that any causal link between the employer's alleged collusive hiring agreement
and injury to the employees was severed by an intervening collective bargaining agreement
between the employer and the employees' union representatives. Id. at 430. In Warner Com-
munications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Del. 1984), it was held that a firm
involved in a takeover could not claim that it was injured by prior fraudulent acts of the
target firm's management because the previous concealment of those acts was cured by in-
tervening regulatory disclosures and attendant publicity. See id. at 1490-92.
17 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 504 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall recognized
that a civil RICO defendant faces "a tremendous financial exposure in addition to the threat
of being labeled a 'racketeer."' Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) Justice Marshall also noted
that "[m]any a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even a case
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conduct?4"
II. RICO-BASED HAZARDOUS WASTE CASES
Several recent RICO-based hazardous waste cases illustrate
the difficulties hazardous waste victims face in satisfying RICO's
causation element. In Standard Equipment, Inc. v. Boeing Co.,49 a
predicate act injury case, the plaintiff brought a RICO claim
against the operator of a hazardous waste storage site, as well as
generators and transporters of hazardous waste.50 The plaintiff al-
leged that its property had been contaminated by hazardous waste
that had migrated through the soil from a neighboring storage
site.51 The plaintiff further alleged that the operator of the storage
site engaged in fraudulent mail and wire communications with gov-
ernment officials and that the other generators and transporters
were aware or should have been aware of the fraudulent conduct.2
with no merit." Id. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Further, RICO "cases take their toll;
their results distort the market by saddling legitimate businesses with uncalled-for punitive
bills and undeserved labels." Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8 Only criminal intent satisfies RICO's mental culpability requirement. See Albanese
v. City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 710 F. Supp. 563, 566-67 (D.N.J. 1989) (municipality cannot
have requisite criminal intent to violate RICO's substantive provisions). Thus, it may be
appropriate in some circumstances to widen RICO's scope of liability, unless an overriding
statutory policy mandates otherwise. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 547-49 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In a case
involving section 4 of the Clayton Act, Justice Marshall noted that an antitrust violation is
essentially a statutory tort, and explained:
Although many legal battles have been fought over the extent of tort liability for
remote consequences of negligent conduct, it has always been assumed that the
victim of an intentional tort can recover from the tortfeasor if he proves that the
tortious conduct was a cause-in-fact of his injuries. An inquiry into proximate
cause has traditionally been deemed unnecessary in suits against intentional
tortfeasors. For example, if one party makes false representations to another, in-
tending them to be communicated to a third party and acted upon to his detri-
ment, the third party can bring an action for misrepresentation against the origi-
nator of the false information if he suffers injury as a result. Indeed, in many
situations the common law holds an intentional tortfeasor liable even for the un-
foreseeable consequences of his conduct.
Id. at 547-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Justice
Marshall indicated that only overriding statutory policy should alter these common law
rules. See id. at 549-52. (Marshall, J., dissenting) Since RICO is also a statutory tort, see
supra note 23, it would appear that Justice Marshall's concerns are equally relevant to
RICO.
48 16 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,246 (Envtl. L. Inst.) (W.D. Wash. 1985).
0 Id.




In light of the plaintiff's argument that it was unable to refinance
loans due to property devaluation caused by the contamination, 3
the court held that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that its
injuries were proximately caused by the RICO enterprise's com-
mission of mail and wire fraud. 4 However, the court failed to ex-
plain exactly how the causation requirement was met.
In a second predicate act injury case, Huntsman-Christensen
Corp. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,55 the plaintiff had entered a
lease and purchase agreement with the defendant for a parcel of
land.5 6 In its RICO claim, the plaintiff alleged that prior to the
agreement the defendant disposed of hazardous wastes on the
leased site.57 The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had en-
gaged in fraudulent wire and mail communications with govern-
ment officials concerning its illegal hazardous waste disposal prac-
tices, and that "but for" those fraudulent communications the
plaintiff would have known of the contamination and would not
have entered into the agreement.58 Rejecting the result reached in
Standard Equipment, the court in Mountain Fuel held that while
the plaintiff adequately alleged cause-in-fact, those "injuries that
were the indirect and incidental consequence . . . [of fraud were]
not proximate and outside the scope of RICO."' 9
It is submitted that the Standard Equipment and Mountain
Fuel courts approached the causation element unsatisfactorily.
Cause-in-fact cannot be established if the damage complained of
(pollution of property) occurred prior to the alleged cause (mail
and wire fraud)60 The facts in neither case clarify whether the
plaintiff's damages were incurred after the alleged pattern of mail
or wire fraud. Also, since the mail fraud and the unsafe disposal of
hazardous waste were concurrent causes, the substantial factor test
shows that the unsafe disposal and not the alleged mail fraud was
the substantial cause of each plaintiff's property damage.61 More-
"3 Id. at 20,246.
4 Id. at 20,247-48.
80 No. C86-530G (D. Utah Nov. 24, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file).
Id. at 3.
7 d.
'8 Id. at 4, 11.
' Id. at 16.
0 See Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94-95 (1944). In Kann, the Court held that
mail posted subsequent to the execution of the scheme to defraud would not support a
conviction. Id. at 95.
01 See Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1168 (3d Cir. 1989). In
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over, neither court adequately analyzed proximate cause. First, in
each case, the court did not determine whether the plaintiff or a
third party relied on the alleged mail and wire fraud.2 Without
such reliance, the causal nexus between the plaintiff's injuries and
the RICO violation is severed."3 Second, in both cases, a finding of
proximate cause was not consistent with RICO's purposes. RICO
was designed to eradicate organized crime and to prevent its infil-
tration into legitimate businesses."4 It was not meant to eradicate
hazardous waste mismanagement. While legitimate businesses also
are subject to RICO prosecution, 5 courts are urged to consider
RICO's express purposes as part of the proximate cause analysis.
Third, the Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),"6 notwithstanding its weak-
nesses as a remedy for private plaintiffs,67 was enacted with the
clear purpose of compensating hazardous waste victims and RICO
should not supersede CERCLA's remedial function. 8 Finally, each
plaintiff's injuries were foreseeable consequences of waste misman-
agement, rather than acts of mail fraud.6
In Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc.,7 0 a
competitive injury case, a toxic waste transporter alleged that a
Shearin, a company officer was discharged for her failure to participate in a racketeering
scheme against customers. Id. at 1164. The court held that the act of firing, not the racke-
teering activity, was the substantial cause of her pecuniary loss. Id. at 1168.
62 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
" See id.
" Evidence suggests that organized crime has infiltrated the hazardous waste disposal
business, resulting in environmental abuses and a decrease in competition within that indus-
try. See Profile of Organized Crime, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (details evidence of such
organized crime activity in New York and New Jersey); Organized Crime and Hazardous
Waste Disposal, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (overview of investigations into such organized
crime activity). See generally A. BLOCK & F. ScARPIrrI, POISONING FOR PROFIT: THE MAFIA
AND Toxic WASTE IN AMERICA passim (1985) (illegal disposal of toxic waste and organized
crime's contribution to such hazardous pollution in light of its heavy influence and control
of American waste disposal).
65 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (definition of "enterprise" in
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) "appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within
its scope").
66 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988).
17 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
66 Cf. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 507 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that
"with respect to effects on the federal securities laws and other federal regulatory statutes,
we should be reluctant to displace the well-entrenched federal remedial schemes absent
clear direction from Congress." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)
66 Cf. Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1988).
70 720 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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competitor had gained an unlawful competitive advantage in secur-
ing Navy contracts by making fraudulent mail and wire communi-
cations with the Navy concerning its compliance with environmen-
tal laws and regulations. 71 The plaintiff argued that "but for
defendants' wrongful conduct, contracts awarded to them by the
Navy would have been awarded to the plaintiff. 7 2 The court, with-
out explaining its reasoning, found that the plaintiff had standing
on its RICO claim.
73
In Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Rollins Environmental Services,
Inc.,4 also a competitive injury case, a transporter brought a RICO
claim against a waste generator, alleging that through the use of
the mails, the generator intentionally had misrepresented the con-
tents of its hazardous waste to various landfill operators. 5 The
plaintiff alleged that it had been injured in its business and prop-
erty in that it lost an exclusive landfill contract and incurred costs
from an official investigation of its waste disposal activities. 6 The
court held that the plaintiff had not adequately established causa-
tion, primarily because plaintiff's failure to notify the landfill
owner of the wrongdoing once he became aware of it, constituted a
superseding cause of its damages.77
In Southwest Marine, it would seem that the court's finding of
proximate cause was warranted. First, holding the competitor
transporter liable was consistent with RICO's purposes in that
while the defendant may not have been a member of organized
crime, the defendant was using racketeering activity to infiltrate
and acquire an interest in the legitimate indusfry of hazardous
waste disposal. 8 Second, the plaintiff's injuries were a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's competitive advantage
gained from racketeering activity.7 9 Third, no superseding or inter-
vening cause lessens the effect of mail or wire fraud on government
officials.80
It is submitted that the court in Waste Conversion also ap-
1 Id. at 803.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 No. 88-7792 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file).
75 Id. at 2, 4.
786 Id. at 3-4.
77 Id. at 17-18.
78 See supra notes 8 & 65 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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proached causation satisfactorily. The court correctly found that
the defendant's violation of RICO was not the proximate cause of
the expense incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the official in-
vestigation of its disposal activities, since the plaintiff's own fraud-
ulent communications with the landfill operator had acted as a su-
perseding cause of his business damages and consequent loss of
competitiveness. 81
CONCLUSION
RICO acts as a powerful deterrent to those who seek to infil-
trate a legitimate industry through racketeering activity. In RICO-
based hazardous waste disputes, however, reliance on mail and
wire fraud as predicate offenses effectively prevents at least one
class of injured plaintiffs from recovering property damages. Fortu-
nately, in the competitive injury context, RICO does serve as an
appropriate remedy to cleanse the hazardous waste disposal indus-
try of racketeers who force law-abiding transporters out of
business.
John M. O'Reilly
81 Id.
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